March 3, 2005

Fortune is a Woman

It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain her. And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general. But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not. Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears. I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. Nicolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1512), Chapter XXV, “What fortune can effect in human affairs and how to withstand her”
January 18, 2005

Bush Baby-Boomers Take Care of Their Own

GEN-X BEWARE! And all you ever-ambiguous Blank Generation folk, among whom I number myself, you ought to wake up too.

For once again, the post-war Baby-Boomers, arguably the most pampered, selfish and programmatically self-indulgent generation in American history, are preparing to take care of themselves at the direct expense of their younger brothers and sisters, children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren.

At least, that’s the impression one gets reading the Bush-Cato Social Security Administration’s online Frequently Asked Questions About Social Security’s Future.

(Also beware that under the Bush administration we live in an Orwellian world where official government websites frequently change their ‘facts and figures’ with political calculus, so the following quoted passages may no longer be there when you go to look.)

But as it stands at this writing, the Social Security Administration’s official FAQ About Social Security’s Future is a powerful object lesson in the crude directness of the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy the Bush administration is already deploying in hope of obtaining the Holy Grail of the Republican Right, the destruction of Social Security and the humane social compact of the New Deal that underlies it: that we Americans live by something higher than the law of the jungle, that we are in deed as well as word our brother’s keeper.

And Gen-Xers, that brother is you.

Let’s take the Social Security Administration’s FAQ About Social Security’s Future from the top, question by question, descending age bracket by age bracket, and see what the Cato Institute has in store for each of us.

Q.

I am retired and receiving a monthly check from Social Security. Are my monthly payments going to be cut?

A.

No, there are no plans to cut benefits for current retirees. In fact, benefits will continue to be increased each year with inflation.

Over 67. You’re doing just fine. Relax. Go back to sleep. Take your pills. Don’t come out to vote or write Congress on this one. Enjoy the benefits of the system you wisely counted on and defended all your life. It’s there for you.

Screw your grandkids. The damn ingrates, never visit and never think of anyone but themselves anyway.

Q.

I’ll be retiring in the next five to 10 years. Can I expect my presently scheduled benefits to be paid to me at retirement?

A.

Many reform plans, including those put forth by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security, preserve scheduled benefits, including cost- of-living increases, for near-retirees. Depending on the proposal, a "near-retiree" is defined as someone aged 50 to 55 and older.

Oh ho, Baby-Boomers, here you are. Your generation’s bloated numbers are supposed to be the cause of this "Social Security Crisis." You’re the reason Bush claims we need to destroy this system in order to save it.

But what does this administration promise Baby-Boomers, the most pampered, selfish and programmatically self-indulgent generation in American history?

Surprise, surprise. The Baby Boomers are going to "grandfather" themselves in!

Everything will be just fine. No reason to raise a stink about what happens to someone else. The selfish joy ride of life just continues, as it should. After all, Bush himself is a Baby-Boomer, perhaps the paradigmatic Baby-Boomer of our times.

Q.

My parents are receiving Social Security payments. Should I be worried that their monthly checks will be cut and that I will have to make up the difference?

A.

No, there are no plans to reduce benefits for current retirees. In fact, benefits will continue to grow annually with inflation.

A sleight of hand detour from the descent from age bracket to age bracket. Here is where the FAQ should address the future Social Security prospects of Generation X and the slightly older and edgier Blank Generation.

And perhaps it is, singing its siren song: Don’t worry, there’s no danger you’ll ever have to cough up for your parents.

Pay no attention to the man behind the green curtain and his plans for you.

Q.

I am receiving disability benefits from Social Security. Should I be worried that my monthly check will be cut?

A.

Most plans, including those put forth by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security, do not reduce the benefits of currently disabled beneficiaries.

Being disabled. The detour continues. In the future Bush and the Cato Institute have in store, if you’re not rich, disability’s about as nice a piece of work as you can get, regardless your race, creed, color, sex or age, if you can get it. Maybe we should all start planning on disability now.

After all, that also marvelously gets around the Clinton administration’s nobly passed "term-limits" on welfare recipients.

Q.

I’m 35 years old. If nothing is done to improve Social Security, what can I expect to receive in retirement benefits from the program?

A.

Unless changes are made, at age 73 your scheduled benefits could be reduced by 27 percent and could continue to be reduced every year thereafter from presently scheduled levels.

Suddenly, we’re 35. What happened to the 40-somethings? Never mind them. It’s you thirty year olds who are in deep trouble. You and your peers better get with the program now. Without Bush, there’s nothing in Social Security for you.

Since you’re Gen-X, we suspect you never really learned how to add and subtract. So we’re rather sure you won’t notice that even Bush & Company’s pessimistic projections of the draw on the trust fund, at age 73, you will have already been receiving full benefits for six years and, at least if you are male, your life expectancy is only a few years more.

So just don’t look at the fact that, as a simple selfish bet, it’s really touch and go whether you’d want to change anything, even if the whole system were really to go to the dogs after you.

No! No! Panic Now! Support the President!

Q.

I’m 25 years old. If nothing is done to change Social Security, what can I expect to receive in retirement benefits from the program?

A.

Unless changes are made, when you reach age 63 in 2042, benefits for all retirees could be cut by 27 percent and could continue to be reduced every year thereafter. If you lived to be 100 years old in 2079 (which will be more common by then), your scheduled benefits could be reduced by 33 percent from today’s scheduled levels.

So you’re 25. Oh my! Lucky you. Unlike any previous human generation on the face of the planet, you’re going to live forever! Strong! Healthy! Invincible! At 100! No sense looking out for anyone else. Just grab all you can for yourself. You can do it. And George Bush is here to help you.

No sense throwing away your hard earned dollars on a broken system designed to take care of all those sick old people who are just going to die anyway. The future is yours further than the eye can see.

We’re absolutely certain you haven’t learned jack-shit in the schools we barely provided for you, so you won’t have heard anything about the Hayflick Limit or any of the more prosaic evidence of diminishing returns on further medical "miracles" that contribute to extending human life.

Never mind that if things go Bush’s way, fewer and fewer of you will have access to that kind of health care anyway, as you live out your years in an increasingly polluted, life-shortening, Texas-style environment.

And we know that, unless you’re an immigrant, you know even less math than Generation X, so there’s no chance you’ll notice that no privatization program currently proposed or even imagined is going to fully fund the retirement of anyone living to 100. Social Security, even paying 33% less than today’s scheduled levels, beats privatization hands down if you’re still planning to live that long.

Never mind. Never mind. Don’t listen. Plug in that iPod, buy those iTunes, and support your iPresident.

——–

So did you get that Gen-Xers?

Did you notice that gap? That here, as throughout the current public debate over the so-called "Social Security Crisis," you’ve become the unmentionable generation, conveniently omitted from the Bush Baby-Boomer’s right-wing plans to divide and conquer, destroying Social Security for you and your children, all the while taking care of themselves and their generation?

Better wake up and take a lesson from the generational playbook of your selfish elders:

Come gather ’round people
Wherever you roam
And admit that the waters
Around you have grown
And accept it that soon
You’ll be drenched to the bone.
If your time to you
Is worth savin’
Then you better start swimmin’
Or you’ll sink like a stone
For the times they are a-changin’.
–Bob Dylan (1963)

January 16, 2005

Hallowed Halls

The ivy crept over the house, a green plague, relentless. The house, that human construct lay beneath, consumed. Some looking would call it quaint, ivy covered halls, hallowed halls. I called it death, a slow strangulation, a suffocation within the leafy legion. Its progression was incremental, measured in inches, brick by brick, one crumbled mortar joint at a time, a progression if not quite sapient, then certainly malevolent in its indifference. I dreamt I dwelt in hallowed halls, ivy covered halls, dreams of greenness, of decay. Think you green is life and spring and rebirth. No, it feeds, it feeds on us, our constructs and fabrications. Green is the predator and we its prey. Each year, in spring, I stripped it from the walls. Patiently, carefully detaching the delicate tendrils, the creepers, that had wound themselves into the walls, insinuated themselves into the mortar rendering what had bound the brick into structure, instead into crumbling ruin. I started gently, as if extricating my hand from that of a child or lover and ended by madly hacking at the trunk. Seeking to sever the main vine and end it all, abruptly, completely. Each spring I free the house by tearing away the green. Red brick emerges, rich and earthy. The windows come alive with life and light, the eyes into a soul. But summer passes and fall comes, inexorably the ivy returns, the fine tendrils grow back, seeking, prying, invading. The light goes out, the life dies and dark within dark, the windows reflect only the emptiness inside.
December 24, 2004

Why bother about WhyBother.org?

What a pain, a nuisance, annoyance, what trouble, what a bother and botheration it is to inconvenience oneself, to overstrain, extend oneself, to get all hyped up, psyched up, to overexert oneself, all set to trouble oneself, almost kill oneself just to maintain a “vanity” web site year after year after year! Now in the vainest of all vain glories, a blog format.

Why Bother? After all, the net takes you nowhere….

In any event, I have no answer to those questions. Nor do I need any.

Whybother.org was formally created as a website on August 26, 1999. But “Why Bother” as a vague kind of virtual dis-organization, with a finite but shadowy membership, has a much longer history, reaching back into the deep dark recesses of mid-1970’s Berkeley.

My lips are sealed….

But in anticipatory celebration of the New Year, I thought why not fly the old flag, yet one more time? Why not display WhyBother.org’s original (and excessive) background and splash site artwork?

So here they are with their original site section titles, each one an incredibly degraded palimpsest of bad visual technologies, each on its own a little object lesson in much abused “Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” as Walter Benjamin (Illuminations) said in the middle of the last century, now extended digitally into the next:

The Net | Welcome Politics Technology Image Music Text Poetry Places
Film and TV Culture Video Links Archive Chat Whatever Help
December 23, 2004

Tropic of Cancer

From Narrative Detours: Henry Miller and the Rise of New Critical Modernism (1989)

Introduction: “I want to make a detour….”

I want to make a detour of those lofty arid mountain ranges where one dies of thirst and cold, that “extra-temporal” history, that absolute of time and space where there exists neither man, beast, nor vegetation, where one goes crazy with loneliness, with language that is mere words, where everything is unhooked, ungeared, out of joint with the times. I want a world of men and women, of trees that do not talk (because there is too much talk in the world as it is!), of rivers that carry you to places, not rivers that are legends, but rivers that put you in touch with other men and women, with architecture, religion, plants, animals–rivers have boats on them and in which men drown, drown not in myth and legend and books and dust of the past, but in time and space and history.
Henry Miller, Tropic of Cancer

Few products of the self-styled “Revolution of the Word” of the 1920s and 1930s have proved more disturbing to our sense of what is or ought to be valued art than Tropic of Cancer (1934), Black Spring (1936), and Tropic of Capricorn (1939).[1] Other modernist novels, more radical and more conventional, move in and out of critical and public view, but for half a century Henry Miller‘s expatriate narratives have visibly marked the contentious boundary between “good” and “bad” art, “serious literature” and “popular fiction,” “aesthetic creation” and “pornographic exploitation.” Since he first appeared in the “twilight of the expatriates” as “the spokesman, par excellence, for the Left Bank,” Miller has inspired the fervid efforts of advocates and adversaries seeking to establish his centrality to modern American literature and life, or to expunge him from literary and even popular imagination.[2] In neither direction have these partisan efforts succeeded. Miller’s work continues to sell, influence contemporary fiction, and provoke violent debate whenever raised. Instead of settling the “Miller question,” the debate over Miller’s place in American letters has complicated and raised the stakes of an “answer.” Feminists, from Kate Millet to Catharine MacKinnon, have joined in improbable alliance with Miller’s partisans in impugning the methods and motives of those who would hold Miller at a tasteful distance from the literary tradition.[3] Attempts to strike a more dispassionate critical balance between the claims of Miller’s friends and foes have proved inadequate, mixing hot and cold to produce the kind of lukewarm “assessment” that gives academic criticism the reputation of irrelevance: no one can read very far into Tropic of Cancer, Black Spring or Tropic of Capricorn without realizing that an “open mind” is the most inappropriate of responses. Miller emerged with a generation of writers who cultivated controversy as a sign of success in challenging established literary canons; almost alone he has remained controversial, in good conscience neither acceptable nor dismissible. Through five decades of criticism the refrain runs, “This fellow can write: but[….]”[4]

The debate over Miller’s proper place inside or outside our mainstream literary tradition has obscured the more intriguing historical questions posed by the ambiguous position he already occupies and has occupied since the 1930s. Miller has been that most paradoxical of literary creatures, a “minor writer” with “major relevance” (Kingsley Widmer), a writer whose works are critically devalued and politically denounced, but whose influence upon urban American writing from the Beats of the fifties to the New Journalism of the seventies and eighties is as pronounced as Faulkner’s upon southern and rural fiction.[5] I propose to explore the phenomenon of Miller’s ambiguous status. How has the modern literary tradition been constructed that a manifestly serious and influential novelist can be both “minor” and “major,” without and within, at the same time? What is it about Tropic of Cancer, Black Spring, and Tropic of Capricorn that has made them the object of a fifty-year open debate over literary and cultural values–continuing even as literary criticism parted company with that magisterial arbiter of taste, the gentleman scholar, in order to immerse itself in technical, linguistic and philosophic questions of textual hermeneutics?

Answers to these questions might be sought at any point in the history of the reception of Miller’s expatriate narratives, a history which includes his subsequent novels and essays. Forty-eight years old when he returned to America after nearly a decade in Paris, Miller outlived most of his fellow expatriates, continuing to write for another four decades until his death in 1979. These later additions to Miller’s oeuvre inevitably reshaped the meaning of his Paris narratives, which, like Miller himself, led a varied public life after the onset of the Second World War ended “The Revolution of the Word.” The American publication of Miller’s “banned books” under the banner of “freedom of expression” in the early 1960s, and Kate Millet’s feminist indictment in Sexual Politics (1969) of the “sexual liberation” this “freedom” was supposed to herald, initiated major shifts in the terms under which Miller’s “value” has been debated. But Miller’s ambiguous position in American letters antedates and survives these developments. Already in 1938, Edmund Wilson’s review of Tropic of Cancer for The New Republic uncannily anticipates the polarized outline, if not the precise terms, of all subsequent debate over Miller’s work: “Today the conventional critics are evidently too shocked by it to be able to bring themselves to deal with it–though their neglect of it cannot wholly have been determined by the reflex reactions of squeamishness. [….] As for the Left-Wingers, they have ignored The Tropic of Cancer on the ground that it is merely a product of the decadent expatriate culture and can be of no interest to the socially minded and forward-looking present.”[6]

If Wilson’s review anticipates the tenor of ensuing dispute over Miller, it sounds a note that has escaped most subsequent critics. According to Wilson, the “historical importance” of Tropic of Cancer lies in Miller’s attempt to write “the epitaph for the whole generation of American writers and artists that migrated to Paris after the war.” “We are going to put it down–the evolution of this world which has died but which has not been buried,” Miller wrote, setting out upon a polemical “detour” to change the direction “The Revolution of the Word” was taking.[7] Miller’s ambition was unduly optimistic; Wilson’s assent too sanguine.[8] As readers, writers, and critics we still live, affirmatively or antithetically, in the shadow of the consensus forged by a “Lost Generation” they thought dead and awaiting burial. Frustrated in its grand design, Miller’s challenge to the aesthetic values and interpretive conventions successfully advanced by many of his fellow expatriates succeeded only in installing his narrative modernism proximate to–ambiguously inside and outside–our canon of “New Critical” modernism. In consequence, even after fifty years Miller’s language has a strangely contemporary sound: his narrative modernism gives voice to intimations of modernity omitted from the “mythic” and “symbolist” consensus that formed high modernism. But equally, Miller’s narrative dissent has placed his novels outside the interpretive conventions that give us ready, empathetic access to the coherence, structure, and intention of canonical texts, rendering his alternative modernism vulnerable to social and political criticism for what, though manifest throughout the received modern tradition, we tend to excuse or extenuate in the name of Art, Irony, and Tragic error. The controversy Miller’s expatriate novels are still capable of stirring is but another indication that we have yet to come to terms with the legacy of his generation’s literary battles.

It is Miller’s historically close and antithetical relation to the writers and critics whose work would form the basis of New Critical modernism that, more than his Whitmanesque “barbaric yawp,” has made it difficult to “read” Tropic of Cancer, Black Spring, and Tropic of Capricorn as anything other than second-rate Modernism or an “anti-literature” indifferent to aesthetic considerations. Miller’s expatriate works are neither. They embody an ambitious writer’s calculated response to the debate over the shape of the “New Novel” he joined in 1930–the year the first “guidebook” to the “classical” Ulysses, James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’: A Study by Stuart Gilbert, ratified and elaborated Eliot’s strident declaration in “‘Ulysses,’ Order, and Myth,” “Instead of narrative method, we may now use the mythical method.”[9] Discerning the formation of a literary and critical alliance, Miller intuited its transformative power even as he sought to resist it:

Already, almost coincidentally with their appearance, we have, as a result of Ulysses and Work in Progress, nothing but dry analyses, archaeological burrowings, geological surveys, laboratory tests of the Word. The commentators, to be sure, have only begun to chew on Joyce. The Germans will finish him. They will make Joyce palatable, understandable, clear as Shakespeare, better than Joyce, better than Shakespeare. Wait! The mystagogues are coming![10]

It is paradoxically Miller’s attention in formulating his narrative strategy to the politics of modern aesthetic debate–his prescient engagement with that coalition of writers, critics, and theorists who would successfully reshape twentieth-century aesthetics in their own image–that has left him an inexplicable, harsh voice on the margins of “the modern tradition.” Miller’s radically digressive, free-flowing prose style advances a post-realist/post-naturalist “narrative method” that closely pursues and disputes, almost point for point, the then emerging “mythic” consensus. Resembling Leopold Bloom’s wandering excursions through the streets of Dublin, Miller’s narrative method suggests, but in whole and in part refuses, the symbolic, mythic, and perspectival integration that has become fundamental to our sense of what “truly” Modern texts are “about.” As a consequence of Miller’s own efforts, any attempt to pursue a “close reading” of his Paris narratives as if they were New Critical texts is an experience in frustration: Miller seems either a writer who knows what he ought to do but can’t do it, or a writer who doesn’t know what he’s doing but occasionally does it–“it” being some recognizable, interpretable, and hence valuable variation of what Ulysses, the paradigmatic novel of New Critical modernism, does so thoroughly when “read closely.”

If Miller’s more explicit diatribes against Joyce receive some notice, the extent to which his narratives embody a thoroughgoing critique remains largely unexplored–the very idea that a writer as “undisciplined” as Miller might mount anything approaching a “serious” challenge to Ulysses seems preposterous. But we view Ulysses through a long history of adulatory exegesis, forgetting that Eliot’s influential unveiling of the “Order, and Myth” of Ulysses served an occasional, polemical purpose: to fend off Richard Aldington’s charge that Joyce’s was a “great undisciplined talent” and his work “an invitation to chaos, and an expression of feelings which are perverse, partial, and a distortion of reality.”[11] When Miller wrote, “Confusion is a word we have invented for an order which is not understood,” it was still a resonant call to battle and not yet hollow vanity.[12] The hegemony of New Critical modernism–the naturalization of interpretive techniques that give us ready access to the coherence, structure, and intention of canonical texts–has replaced Joyce’s modernist “experiment,” first among equals, with the one and only, insurmountable Modernist “monument.” To recover the structure, coherence, and intention of Miller’s narrative “experiment” it is necessary to effect an imaginative return to Paris of the 1920s and 1930s, to the vociferous debate over the shape of the “New Novel,” and to the polemical “detour” that first took Miller to the margins of twentieth-century literature.

Read as one of many expatriate efforts to wrest control of the modern novel’s future, Miller’s Paris narratives, and especially Tropic of Cancer, reveal a dense weave of “tactical” allusions, engaging not “myth and legend and books and dust of the past” according to Eliotic prescription, but the contemporary positions, literary and critical, of Miller’s Modernist rivals. Through such allusions Tropic of Cancer‘s declaration of intention–“I want to make a detour[….]” (epigraph to this introduction)–specifies the aesthetics around which its narrative seeks a path. As the phrasing of this manifesto suggests, Miller’s response to the emerging Modernist consensus involves no broadside denigration of Joyce’s achievement in Ulysses and “Work in Progress,” but rather a canny challenge to these works as interpreted by Louis Gillet in transition (“‘extra-temporal history'”), by Edmund Wilson in Axel’s Castle (where the talking tree and stone, and river puns of Anna Livia Plurabelle were cited to evaluate “Work in Progress”), and by T. S. Eliot in “‘Ulysses,’ Order, and Myth.” The argument uniting these allusions draws upon the “meta-fiction” novelists and their critical partisans have always invoked to legitimate their formal innovations over and against all others: the novel is “the historical genre,” distinguished by its protean ability to embody and represent the historical forces that constitute a changing world. Miller turns the rhetoric of the novel’s historicity to his own ends, insinuating that the “mystagogues” who read and value in Joyce’s novels an “‘extra-temporal history,’ that absolute of time and space […] and mere words,” are but revealing and canonizing Ulysses and “Work in Progress” as dead ends in the genealogy of the novel: the “true” modern novel must follow Tropic of Cancer‘s narrative “detour” to return to the proper path of “the historical genre” through “time and space and history.” The generic discourse of Miller’s dissent points to the vitality of an aesthetic debate broader than any linear, genealogical approach to the novel’s history, however “revisionary,” can discern–a debate within which New Critical modernism, Miller’s narrative modernism, and many other contending “modernisms” were first forged and only subsequently obscured.

This essay proceeds as a “local study” in the history of the modern novel, using the instance of Henry Miller‘s Paris narratives and their ambiguous place in our received tradition to test the grounds of a literary history attentive to the formation of literary values, tracing their genesis and legacy in dissent as well as assent. How can we, as literary historians, recover from the “texts” we examine a sense of the past that is something more than a linear genealogy of “great, influential works” around which lies a disordered library of “lesser works,” “curiosities,” and “failures” into which we periodically venture to “invent” new “usable pasts,” new genealogies of “great works”? My local study of a most controversial novelist, who for so long and for so many highly charged reasons has been held at arm’s length from the Modernist canon, is intended to suggest the outlines of an answer. If attention to the aesthetic discourse within which coalitions of writers and critics vie for the authority to promulgate “the tradition” discloses a heretofore unsuspected density and coherence to Miller’s narrative and aesthetic polemics, such an approach is likely to do the same for other apparent “detours,” past and present, from the literary genealogy New Critical modernism traces back to Homer. At stake is not simply Miller’s “place” within a divisive twentieth-century literature, but our understanding of other alternatives to New Critical modernism, less controversial, whose polemical engagement in “serious” novelistic discourse yet remains concealed beneath the literary and critical consensus first forged in the 1920s and 1930s.

Two relatively recent developments in literary scholarship signal a renewed need for literary history as an integrative mode of analysis, even as they undermine the premises that once made literary history a matter of checking biographies, tracing influences, and constructing of these the literary genealogies of Great Writers and Great Works. The first is the “deconstructive” critique of hermeneutics, which has dispossessed the text of that isolate, self-contained structural integrity of meaning which the New Critics viewed as the key to interpretation and cultural value. Perhaps more important, the second development is the renewed interest in the values and techniques of those works from which high modernism and New Criticism maintained a studied distance: realism, naturalism, ethnic/local color, and proletarian literature. Feminist scholarship, with its search for difference in writing and its desire to recover women’s experience, has participated in and energized both these developments. The result on all scores has been an “information explosion” in literary studies which, I believe, awaits a renewed sense of literary history to weigh, distribute, relate, and assimilate; for only a sense of history, and not the theoretical imagination, however “decentered,” can juggle the simultaneous and sequential proliferation of competing views and values which the current “explosion” discovers to be constituent of our literary past and present.

Yet in the face of this task, literary history remains in quest of its own grounds. How does one locate the meaning of a text and its relations to other texts when meaning seems no longer a property of the text and every text appears an “intertext” equally related and unrelated to every other text? Where does one place the “canon” and how does one recognize its imaginative power when a vast body of once “marginal” works and literatures are subject to an increasing scrutiny which has had the effect of making the “canon” suddenly appear “marginal” itself, a preoccupation of a few individuals and institutions dwarfed by the onward rush of popular culture and history? This essay explores the possibility of a literary history in the current critical landscape: one capable of asking not what or how texts mean, but what they have meant; one capable of describing the literary and interpretive acts whereby the aesthetic hegemony of New Critical modernism was first forged and then sustained in the face of many alternatives. To find such a capability is to make it possible to ask a new, distinctively historical set of questions concerning the “meaning” and “place” of Miller’s expatriate narratives. How must we read Tropic of Cancer, Black Spring, and Tropic of Capricorn in order to understand them in dialogic relation with other modernist “experiments” such as Joyce’s Ulysses–more simply, how did Miller’s narratives speak to the contemporary struggle to define the nature of modern literature? And, in turn, how must we narrate literary and critical history in order to explain how among many competing modernist “experiments” some, but not Miller’s, became Modernist “monuments”? It is through these two questions and their interrelation that I hope to retain for this essay in the history of the modern novel some of the rigor of “close reading” lost to more sweeping accounts, and as well to lend broader and, I intend, unsettling implication to such a local study of a “minor” modernist.


NOTES

[1] Epigraph: Henry Miller, Tropic of Cancer (Paris: The Obelisk Press, 1934; New York: Grove Press, 1961; New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), 231.

[2] Edmund Wilson, “The Twilight of the Expatriates,” in A Literary Chronicle: 1920-1950 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company-Doubleday Anchor Books, n.d.), 212. This is a collection derived from Classics and Commercials (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1950) and Shores of Light (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1952). “The Twilight of the Expatriates” first appeared in The New Republic (March 9, 1938).

[3] Kate Millet opens Sexual Politics (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970; New York: Avon Books, 1971) with an explicit attack upon literary history, narrowly conceived, and “New Criticism”:

It has been my conviction that the adventure of literary criticism is not restricted to a dutiful round of adulation, but is capable of seizing upon the larger insights which literature affords into the life it describes, or interprets, or even distorts. [….] I have also found it reasonable to take an author’s ideas seriously when, like the novelists covered in this study, they wish to be taken seriously or not at all. Where I have substantive quarrels with some of these ideas, I prefer to argue on those very grounds, rather than to take cover under tricks of the trade and mask disagreement with “sympathetic readings” or the still more dishonest pretense that the artist is “without skill” or a “poor technician.” (Sexual Politics, 12)

Protesting the critical marginalization of Miller’s work, Millet writes: “The anxiety and contempt which Miller registers toward the female sex is at least as important and generally felt as the more diplomatic or ‘respectful’ version presented to us in conventional writing,” in which Millet includes “not only traditional courtly, romantic and Victorian sentiment, but even that of other moderns [such as] Conrad, Joyce, even Faulkner” (Sexual Politics, 389).

Extending Millet’s suspicion that Miller is excluded because his inclusion would reveal the misogyny of the “tradition,” Catharine MacKinnon writes: “sometimes I think that the real issue is how male sexuality is presented, so that anything can be done to a woman, but obscenity is sex that makes male sexuality look bad.” She gives new sense to the ideology of “protecting innocence”: “is it just chance that the first film to be found obscene by a state supreme court depicts male masturbation? [….] Did works like Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Tropic of Cancer get in trouble because male sexuality is depicted in a way that men think is dangerous for women and children to see?” (Catharine MacKinnon, “Not a Moral Issue” in Feminism Unmodified [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987], 154, 270n.).

[4] Jay Martin, Always Merry and Bright: The Life of Henry Miller (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Capra Press, 1978; New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 317. Martin quotes George Bernard Shaw, apparently the first to strike this note about Miller: “This fellow can write: but he has failed to give any artistic value to his verbatim reports of bad language.” Evidently, iconoclasm is not made of the same stuff from generation to generation. Frank Kermode took up the refrain: “Everybody agrees that Miller can write[….]” (Frank Kermode, “Henry Miller and John Betjeman,” Puzzles and Epiphanies, reprinted in part in Edward B. Mitchell, ed., Henry Miller: Three Decades of Criticism [New York: New York University Press, 1971], 94).

[5] Kingsley Widmer, Henry Miller (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1963), 157.

[6] Edmund Wilson, “The Twilight of the Expatriates,” A Literary Chronicle: 1920-1950, 212.

[7] Henry Miller, Tropic of Cancer, 24.

[8] As editor, advocate, publicist, central author and creator of Obelisk Press’s “Villa Seurat Series,” Miller tried to gather the adherents necessary to remake a literature during his final years in Paris, but his effort was overtaken by the coming war. He returned to America alone, prepared to pursue new interests.

[9] T. S. Eliot, “‘Ulysses,’ Order, and Myth,” in Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich and Farrar, Straus and Giroux–A Harvest/Noonday Book, 1975), 178. Eliot’s essay was first published in Dial, November 1923.

[10] Henry Miller, “The Universe of Death from The World of Lawrence,” in Henry Miller, The Cosmological Eye (1939; New York: New Directions Paperbook, 1961), 114. The World of Lawrence was written contemporaneously with the revisions of Tropic of Cancer. Abandoned, it was not published in its entirety until the year of Miller’s death. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Capra Press, 1980). The Cosmological Eye, the first collection of Miller’s Paris work published in America, contains a number of essays originally published in Max and the White Phagocytes (Paris: The Obelisk Press-Seurat Editions, 1938).

[11] T. S. Eliot, “‘Ulysses,’ Order, and Myth,” in Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, 176.

[12] Henry Miller, Tropic of Capricorn (Paris: The Obelisk Press-Seurat Editions, 1939; New York: Grove Press, 1961), 170. Miller’s direct allusion is to Henri Bergson’s discussion of “The Idea of Disorder” in Creative Evolution (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911; New York: Random House-The Modern Library, 1944), 240-258.

Copyright 1989 Raoul R. Ibarguen All Rights Reserved.

December 19, 2004

Bush’s Social InSecurity Plan

Just keeping track of the shifting lies, misrepresentations and bait-and-switch tactics of the Bush Administration as it slithers toward that Holy Grail of Right-Wing American politics, the dismemberment and destruction of the New Deal’s Covenant with America, the 1935 Social Security Act, is a dizzying, mind-numbing task.

And it’s meant to be.

It’s among the most fundamental of discoveries of the early masters of effective political propaganda in media-dominated, mass societies — Hearst, Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler — that one’s ideological opponents can be kept permanently off balance and ineffective, endlessly marshalling armies of difficult little facts and seemingly condescending appeals to reason and rationality against the easy big lie that one can tell, re-tell, not tell, offer, modify or drop at a moment’s notice. To the effective political propagandist “facts” and “reasons” are just so many deployable, imaginative fictions in a world come unanchored where any hesitation, any self-restraint for fear of inconsistency is nothing but foolish, indeed, “the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.” Nothing Karl Rove would have any truck with.

And so it’s liable to be all for naught, the mushrooming industry of liberal bloggers, columnists, and pundits now laboring, in detail, to answer, refute and, worst of all, strategize a Democratic response to the economics and injustice of a Bush plan for privatizing social security that doesn’t yet exist in any detail and — you can bet your bottom dollar — won’t exist in any detail until the last legislative minute possible.

But if one must, the best place to go to satisfy any but the most insatiable appetite for exposure of Bush’s and the rest of the right-wing’s lies about Social Security and their own proposals to “reform” and “save” it into non-existence is to Paul Krugman’s Op-Ed columns in The New York Times. Though an academic, intellectual, Princeton ivory-tower economist of the first order and (horror of horrors!) a writer of college textbooks on the subject, Krugman almost always manages a no-nonsense, straight-from-the-hip directness in his columns about issues of political economy. He achieves a voice of American middle-class check-book common sense which eludes most other pundits and bloggers, as all too many lose their way and their readers trying to prove they really do know something about the issue they’re arguing. On that score, Professor Krugman has the marvelous advantage of having absolutely nothing to prove.

Unfortunately, The New York Times is now fast-tracking its Op-Ed content into its fee-based archive so rapidly that, if you don’t stay apace week by week, you’re out of luck and either have to pay a couple dollars apiece for the privilege or wait for Krugman’s next anthology if you want or need to look back through Krugman’s points in this ongoing debate.

For the too poor and too impatient, here are a few samples of Krugman’s basic, just plain, fundamentally informative writing, excerpted from his three most recent columns on Social Security:


Inventing a Crisis, December 7, 2004
There’s nothing strange or mysterious about how Social Security works: it’s just a government program supported by a dedicated tax on payroll earnings, just as highway maintenance is supported by a dedicated tax on gasoline.
Right now the revenues from the payroll tax exceed the amount paid out in benefits. This is deliberate, the result of a payroll tax increase – recommended by none other than Alan Greenspan – two decades ago. His justification at the time for raising a tax that falls mainly on lower- and middle-income families, even though Ronald Reagan had just cut the taxes that fall mainly on the very well-off, was that the extra revenue was needed to build up a trust fund. This could be drawn on to pay benefits once the baby boomers began to retire.
The grain of truth in claims of a Social Security crisis is that this tax increase wasn’t quite big enough. Projections in a recent report by the Congressional Budget Office (which are probably more realistic than the very cautious projections of the Social Security Administration) say that the trust fund will run out in 2052. The system won’t become “bankrupt” at that point; even after the trust fund is gone, Social Security revenues will cover 81 percent of the promised benefits. Still, there is a long-run financing problem.
But it’s a problem of modest size. The report finds that extending the life of the trust fund into the 22nd century, with no change in benefits, would require additional revenues equal to only 0.54 percent of G.D.P. That’s less than 3 percent of federal spending – less than we’re currently spending in Iraq. And it’s only about one-quarter of the revenue lost each year because of President Bush’s tax cuts – roughly equal to the fraction of those cuts that goes to people with incomes over $500,000 a year.
Given these numbers, it’s not at all hard to come up with fiscal packages that would secure the retirement program, with no major changes, for generations to come.

Borrow, Speculate and Hope, December 10, 2004
Privatization would begin by diverting payroll taxes, which pay for current Social Security benefits, into personal investment accounts. The government, already deep in deficit, would have to borrow to make up the shortfall.
This would sharply increase the government’s debt. Never mind, privatization advocates say: in the long run, they claim, people would make so much on personal accounts that the government could save money by cutting retirees’ benefits….
Even so, if personal investment accounts were invested in Treasury bonds, this whole process would accomplish precisely nothing. The interest workers would receive on their accounts would exactly match the interest the government would have to pay on its additional debt. To compensate for the initial borrowing, the government would have to cut future benefits so much that workers would gain nothing at all.
How, then, can privatizers claim that they could secure the future of Social Security without raising taxes or reducing the incomes of future retirees? By assuming that workers would invest most of their accounts in stocks, that these investments would make a lot of money and that, in effect, the government, not the workers, would reap most of those gains, because as personal accounts grew, the government could cut benefits.
We can argue at length about whether the high stock returns such schemes assume are realistic (they aren’t), but let’s cut to the chase: in essence, such schemes involve having the government borrow heavily and put the money in the stock market. That’s because the government would, in effect, confiscate workers’ gains in their personal accounts by cutting those workers’ benefits.
Once you realize that privatization really means government borrowing to speculate on stocks, it doesn’t sound too responsible, does it? But the details make it considerably worse.

Buying Into Failure, December 17, 2004
[A]side from giving the Cato Institute and other organizations promoting Social Security privatization the space to present upbeat tales from Chile, the U.S. news media have provided their readers and viewers with little information about international experience. In particular, the public hasn’t been let in on two open secrets:
Privatization dissipates a large fraction of workers’ contributions on fees to investment companies.
It leaves many retirees in poverty.
Decades of conservative marketing have convinced Americans that government programs always create bloated bureaucracies, while the private sector is always lean and efficient. But when it comes to retirement security, the opposite is true. More than 99 percent of Social Security’s revenues go toward benefits, and less than 1 percent for overhead. In Chile’s system, management fees are around 20 times as high. And that’s a typical number for privatized systems….
Privatizers who laud the Chilean system never mention that it has yet to deliver on its promise to reduce government spending. More than 20 years after the system was created, the government is still pouring in money. Why? Because, as a Federal Reserve study puts it, the Chilean government must “provide subsidies for workers failing to accumulate enough capital to provide a minimum pension.” In other words, privatization would have condemned many retirees to dire poverty, and the government stepped back in to save them.

Be that as it may, the problem Krugman shares with nearly all his fellow liberal critics, refuters and general naysayers to the Right-Wing’s shifting cover stories for a die-hard Social Security abolitionism now nearly three-quarters of a century old is a reluctance to address the issue in simple, old-fashioned “values” terms. And, however correct the critics’ arguments about the fiscal irresponsibility, the utter economic nonsense of the Right’s so-called reforms, this reluctance amounts to conceding the ground on which the Right has chosen to fight, the ground it has been preparing for decades.

There are only two good, effective political arguments for maintaining the Social Security Program as currently structured and against the various social in-security plans Bush and the ideological Republican Right are busier than ever fomenting against it. And they are the very same, simple, direct arguments used to pass the Social Security Act in the first place: Prudence and Morality.

Prudence: Although we are famously a nation that values and rewards “risk takers” over all others, it is simply imprudent in a highly mobile, individualized, modern, market-driven global capitalist economy for even the most self-confident and successful of “risk takers” to rush eagerly also to bet their most rudimentary survival and dignity in old age upon unforeseeable, uncontrollable, distant and chance events, least of all upon the ups and downs of the always crashable stock market.

It is all too easily observed, by anyone who bothers to look beyond their own rosiest hopes and dreams, that, over the course of any human life-span, the race does not invariably go to the swiftest, the smartest, the richest, the bravest, the balls-iest, the most well-prepared, most well-connected, no, not even to the whitest. Better, if at all possible, in case all else fails, to keep that last, simple ace in the hole: At least, I’ll still have the freedom to eat without begging when I’m old and helpless.

Any degree of “privatization,” “individualization” of Social Security, whatever its possible or promised benefits, amounts to a political renunciation of what, since the 1930s, has come to be regarded as a basic human right in America to a certain minimum standard of independence and dignity in old age. To be an American, not someone struggling for existence on the margins of brutal third and fourth world economies, but to be a member of the powerful, privileged society that America is and prides itself on having become, and to choose to put at risk your own as well as your fellow Americans’ baseline, long-term security for no more than some hope of gain is nothing but a bet for fools in the process of being taken for everything for which they can be taken.

Prudence, in this sense, is just a polite term for knowing a sucker bet when you’re offered one.

Morality: Despite the best efforts of the Cato Institute and other right-wing ideology factories to convince us that the sum total of all legitimate moral principle, reasoning and feeling is contained and exhausted in Patrick Henry’s “Give me liberty or give me death!” the Social Security debate poses issues of a somewhat broader moral scope. Reducing morality to a choice between the abstract absolutes of Liberty or Death makes for as fine a recruiting slogan for suicidal idealists and other insurgents against occupying imperial powers today in Gaza and the West Bank, and now Iraq, as it did during the American Revolution, but it’s hardly a sound basis for public discourse in a stable, established, humane society.

Most simply put, the question of Social Security is whether we as a nation and as individuals are morally prepared to return to a society in which we, the young, the healthy, the affluent, live alongside a significant number of our elderly fellow citizens who have been condemned to go hungry and homeless due to circumstances, accidents, mistakes, and even youthful irresponsibility now beyond their diminished capacity to rectify. Are we prepared emotionally and intellectually for such suffering? Can we justify it morally? Not in terms of the suffers’ deserts, just or unjust. Nor in terms of systemic functioning or economy, efficient or inefficient. But in terms of our own morality, our own standing and conscience as human beings sharing life with those less fortunate than ourselves. How far, despite all our loose rhetoric to the effect, are we actually prepared to slide toward an America in which life is truly, voluntarily, designedly, as a matter of public policy choice just a matter of “the survival of the fittest”?

Not surprisingly, the advocates of Social Security privatization, dismemberment and destruction never put the moral choice of Social Security this way. Even their most hell-fire and damnation Evangelical followers might pause over such a vision of market-based “jungle justice” meted out, without possibility of redemption, upon themselves, their near and dear, and members of their own communities. The supposed “immorality” of a government of “We, the People” taxing some of your own and everybody’s hard-earned wages to sustain your elders just wouldn’t stand up too well in a head-to-head face-off against Jesus’ second greatest commandment “to love thy neighbor as thyself.” But in America today, however we might wish it otherwise, where family and community simply lack the resources and resilience they once had to cope successfully with all-too-common human misfortune, that Christian moral commandment, that moral fundamental beyond all religious and secular divide, is precisely the common human duty that the would-be privatizers of social security are asking us to flout.

To find in this century the effective political language to make such points to the American people in a way that builds consensus where none might appear to exist, one need look no further than backward to the proven, effective language of the last century. For those who have never read or heard it, here is President Franklin D. Roosevelt better making the same two arguments of Prudence and Morality as they confront us as fellow citizens of modern, capitalist America:

A Social Security Program Must Include All Those Who Need Its Protection. RADIO ADDRESS ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. AUGUST 15, 1938
You, my friends, in every walk of life and in every part of the Nation, who are active believers in Social Security:
The Social Security Act is three years old today. This is a good vantage point from which to take a long look backward to its beginnings, to cast an appraising eye over what it has accomplished so far, and to survey its possibilities of future growth.
Five years ago the term “social security” was new to American ears. Today it has significance for more than forty million men and women workers whose applications for old-age insurance accounts have been received; this system is designed to assure them an income for life after old age retires them from their jobs.
It has significance for more than twenty-seven and a half million men and women wage earners who have earned credits under State unemployment insurance laws which provide half wages to help bridge the gap between jobs.
It has significance for the needy men, women and children receiving assistance and for their families–at least two million three hundred thousand all told; with this cash assistance one million seven hundred thousand old folks are spending their last years in surroundings they know and with people they love; more than six hundred thousand dependent children are being taken care of by their own families; and about forty thousand blind people are assured of peace and security among familiar voices.
It has significance for the families and communities to whom expanded public health and child welfare services have brought added protection. And it has significance for all of us who, as citizens, have at heart the Security and the well-being of this great democracy.
These accomplishments of three years are impressive, yet we should not be unduly proud of them. Our Government in fulfilling an obvious obligation to the citizens of the country has been doing so only because the citizens require action from their Representatives. If the people, during these years, had chosen a reactionary Administration or a “do nothing” Congress, Social Security would still be in the conversational stage–a beautiful dream which might come true in the dim distant future.
But the underlying desire for personal and family security was nothing new. In the early days of colonization and through the long years following, the worker, the farmer, the merchant, the man of property, the preacher and the idealist came here to build, each for himself, a stronghold for the things he loved. The stronghold was his home; the things he loved and wished to protect were his family, his material and spiritual possessions.
His security, then as now, was bound to that of his friends and his neighbors.
But as the Nation has developed, as invention, industry and commerce have grown more complex, the hazards of life have become more complex. Among an increasing host of fellow citizens, among the often intangible forces of giant industry, man has discovered that his individual strength and wits were no longer enough. This was true not only of the worker at shop bench or ledger; it was true also of the merchant or manufacturer who employed him. Where heretofore men had turned to neighbors for help and advice, they now turned to Government.
Now this is interesting to consider. The first to turn to Government, the first to receive protection from Government, were not the poor and the lowly–those who had no resources other than their daily earnings–but the rich and the strong. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the United States passed protective laws designed, in the main, to give security to property owners, to industrialists, to merchants and to bankers. True, the little man often profited by this type of legislation; but that was a by-product rather than a motive.
Taking a generous view of the situation, I think it was not that Government deliberately ignored the working man but that the working man was not sufficiently articulate to make his needs and his problems known. The powerful in industry and commerce had powerful voices, both individually and as a group. And whenever they saw their possessions threatened, they raised their voices in appeals for government protection.
It was not until workers became more articulate through organization that protective labor legislation was passed. While such laws raised the standards of life, they still gave no assurance of economic security. Strength or skill of arm or brain did not guarantee a man a job; it did not guarantee him a roof; it did not guarantee him the ability to provide for those dependent upon him or to take care of himself when he was too old to work.
Long before the economic blight of the depression descended on the Nation, millions of our people were living in wastelands of want and fear. Men and women too old and infirm to work either depended on those who had but little to share, or spent their remaining years within the walls of a poorhouse. Fatherless children early learned the meaning of being a burden to relatives or to the community. Men and women, still strong, still young, but discarded as gainful workers, were drained of self-confidence and self-respect.
The millions of today want, and have a right to, the same security their forefathers sought–the assurance that with health and the willingness to work they will find a place for themselves in the social and economic system of the time.
Because it has become increasingly difficult for individuals to build their own security single-handed, Government must now step in and help them lay the foundation stones, just as Government in the past has helped lay the foundation of business and industry. We must face the fact that in this country we have a rich man’s security and a poor man’s security and that the Government owes equal obligations to both. National security is not a half and half manner: it is all or none.
The Social Security Act offers to all our citizens a workable and working method of meeting urgent present needs and of forestalling future need. It utilizes the familiar machinery of our Federal-State government to promote the common welfare and the economic stability of the Nation.
The Act does not offer anyone, either individually or collectively, an easy life–nor was it ever intended so to do. None of the sums of money paid out to individuals in assistance or in insurance will spell anything approaching abundance. But they will furnish that minimum necessity to keep a foothold; and that is the kind of protection Americans want.
What we are doing is good. But it is not good enough. To be truly national, a social security program must include all those who need its protection. Today many of our citizens are still excluded from old-age insurance and unemployment compensation because of the nature of their employment. This must be set aright; and it will be.
Some time ago I directed the Social Security Board to give attention to the development of a plan for liberalizing and extending the old-age insurance system to provide benefits for wives, widows and orphans. More recently, a National Health Conference was held at my suggestion to consider ways and means of extending to the people of this country more adequate health and medical services and also to afford the people of this country some protection against the economic losses arising out of ill health.
I am hopeful that on the basis of studies and investigations now under way, the Congress will improve and extend the law. I am also confident that each year will bring further development in Federal and State social security legislation–and that is as it should be. One word of warning, however. In our efforts to provide security for all of the American people, let us not allow ourselves to be misled by those who advocate short cuts to Utopia of fantastic financial schemes.
We have come a long way. But we still have a long way to go. There is still today a frontier that remains unconquered–an America unclaimed. This is the great, the nationwide frontier of insecurity, of human want and fear. This is the frontier–the America–we have set ourselves to reclaim.

Let Bush, Rove, the Cato Institute, and the rest of the right-wing, con-artist, mass-media propagandists of privatizing and dismantling America’s Social Security System try arguing against that for a change.


Arts and Sciences

As human beings dwelling within modern, mass media swept, “information age” societies, it always behooves us to recall that we are not all equally utter novices at the art and science of political propaganda, public relations, advertising, marketing, whatever you wish to call the means by which our opinions, hopes, dreams, our very desires may be and often are molded and directed. Some amongst us are highly educated, whether formally or experientially or most often both, in these arts, these sciences, possessing proven-effective skills that command, bottomline justifiably, among the highest salaries paid in the world today. No product of novices endlessly reinventing the wheel, the achievements of this sort possible today are so because today’s practitioners stand, as the saying goes, “on the shoulders of giants” in their chosen profession:

[T]he magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people in the very bottom of their hearts tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil, and that, therefore, in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds they more easily fall a victim to a big lie than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others; yes, even when enlightened on the subject, they will long doubt and waver, and continue to accept at least one of these causes as true.
–Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Vol 1, Chapter 10
December 17, 2004

Fallow

the ills of marriage, but none of the fruit the mundane, the insipid, the better left unsaid tenderness, intimacy, joy threadbare in the tedium of being better to lie fallow to await another season
December 10, 2004

A Fighting Faith

As if the Cold War nostalgia of the Bush League of Neo-Con Beltway Imperialists and God-Is-On-Our-Side Red State Evangelicals weren’t bad enough, now comes the purportedly left of center editor of The New Republic, Peter Beinart, issuing his own retro clarion call for “a new liberalism,” A Fighting Faith, as he styles it, in a black and white world of American might and right locked in another life or death, existential battle with the forces of totalitarian darkness and their fellow travelers at home and abroad. As he sums up:

Islamist totalitarianism–like Soviet totalitarianism before it–threatens the United States and the aspirations of millions across the world. And, as long as that threat remains, defeating it must be liberalism’s north star. Methods for defeating totalitarian Islam are a legitimate topic of internal liberal debate. But the centrality of the effort is not. The recognition that liberals face an external enemy more grave, and more illiberal, than George W. Bush should be the litmus test of a decent left.

Lest anyone doubt that Beinart’s over-drawn analogy between Islam and Communism, under which there appears in A Fighting Faith no Islam but Jihadist Islam, no possible Communism but Stalinist Communism, as well as his talk of a “litmus test of a decent left” beyond debate, does not betoken a return to the Cold War “loyalty tests,” political purges, and McCarthyite witch hunts of the 1950s, Beinart is at great pains to make his intellectual pedigree explicit from the very start of his manifesto:

On January 4, 1947, 130 men and women met at Washington’s Willard Hotel to save American liberalism. A few months earlier, in articles in The New Republic and elsewhere, the columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop had warned that “the liberal movement is now engaged in sowing the seeds of its own destruction.” Liberals, they argued, “consistently avoided the great political reality of the present: the Soviet challenge to the West.” Unless that changed, “In the spasm of terror which will seize this country … it is the right–the very extreme right–which is most likely to gain victory.”
During World War II, only one major liberal organization, the Union for Democratic Action (UDA), had banned communists from its ranks. At the Willard, members of the UDA met to expand and rename their organization. The attendees, who included Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith, Walter Reuther, and Eleanor Roosevelt, issued a press release that enumerated the new organization’s principles. Announcing the formation of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the statement declared, “[B]ecause the interests of the United States are the interests of free men everywhere,” America should support “democratic and freedom-loving peoples the world over.” That meant unceasing opposition to communism, an ideology “hostile to the principles of freedom and democracy on which the Republic has grown great.”
At the time, the ADA’s was still a minority view among American liberals. Two of the most influential journals of liberal opinion, The New Republic and The Nation, both rejected militant anti-communism. Former Vice President Henry Wallace, a hero to many liberals, saw communists as allies in the fight for domestic and international progress. As Steven M. Gillon notes in Politics and Vision, his excellent history of the ADA, it was virtually the only liberal organization to back President Harry S. Truman’s March 1947 decision to aid Greece and Turkey in their battle against Soviet subversion.
But, over the next two years, in bitter political combat across the institutions of American liberalism, anti-communism gained strength. With the ADA’s help, Truman crushed Wallace’s third-party challenge en route to reelection. The formerly leftist Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) expelled its communist affiliates and The New Republic broke with Wallace, its former editor. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) denounced communism, as did the NAACP. By 1949, three years after Winston Churchill warned that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe, Schlesinger could write in The Vital Center: “Mid-twentieth century liberalism, I believe, has thus been fundamentally reshaped … by the exposure of the Soviet Union, and by the deepening of our knowledge of man. The consequence of this historical re-education has been an unconditional rejection of totalitarianism.”

I quote at length from A Fighting Faith primarily for the benefit of those Democrats unfamiliar with the history of the post-war institutional Democratic Party, specifically with its late 40’s Red-Scare turn which, far from preventing the victory of the “very extreme right,” did much to lay the groundwork for and a lend a “non-partisan” veneer of legitimacy to the more generally known and ever since ritually denounced Republican-driven Red-Baiting terror of Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee of the 1950s. It is well to remember that it was not these ADA Cold War “liberals” who stopped McCarthy. It was the US Army.

Indeed, it is not too much to trace to the ADA’s early, influential capitulation, alternately eager and reluctant, to the late 1940’s and 1950’s Cold War assault upon civil liberties and to the sharp narrowing of the breadth and diversity of American political discourse much of the responsibility for ushering in one of the bleakest and most frightening periods of this nation’s domestic history.

Similarly, in foreign policy, the ADA’s active propagation of the Cold War delusion that wherever the United States faced resistance to its political and economic interests that resistance was both proof and result of a grand, unified, global “Communist Menace” contributed to the political and institutional miscalculations that led the US to intervene in what became the debacle of Vietnam, as well as, more “successfully,” to meddle in the internal politics of even its European allies, and lend its active, overt and covert support to some of the most ruthless, “anti-communist” slaughterers of their own peoples throughout Latin America and South East Asia. Most egregious was in Indonesia in 1965-66, where the labor movement was not afforded the opportunity afforded US labor unions in the late 1940s and 1950s simply to expel “communist affiliates.” Instead the Indonesian labor movement was itself even more simply “liquidated” along with — estimates vary — perhaps 500,000 other Indonesians, with the CIA reportedly helping to supply and keep track of check lists of bad apples that simply had to go for the good of the barrel.

Whatever the ADA’s assignable degree of responsibility for the ultimate conduct of the Cold War, these uglier consequences also compose the legacy of the Cold War “victory” over Communism, which parts some of today’s Washington “liberals,” anxious over Kerry’s defeat and House and Senate losses in the 2004 election, are all too eager to forget in the rush to find and embrace some formula, some ideology, some “magic bullet” that will lead them back to power.

And so we have the truly ugly spectacle of even the likes of preeminent liberal blogger Josh Marshall of Talking Points Memo, in agreeing to disagree with Beinart, proclaiming his own pride and prejudice for the ADA Cold War legacy:

I should start with what I agree with. In fact, I should begin by declaring a prejudice. Like Peter, I see that moment in 1947, the birth of the ADA, and more generally Cold War liberalism as a defining moment and one of the proudest moments of the liberal political tradition in the United States. It is a touchstone against which I measure my own political views.

If the ADA Cold War legacy is indeed now the touchstone against which we must measure our own loyalty and claim to be a part of a “decent left,” we, a great many of us, are doomed to be rather indecent.

And it is precisely the great many of us that is the problem in Beinart’s analysis. It is “We, The People” — at least those of us who are left of center — who just don’t get it, who don’t understand why putting US civil society on a permanent war footing to kill Islamic fundamentalists everywhere they might have or hereafter crop up around the globe is the central, exclusively defining challenge of our time. We, the People, don’t get it. But according to Beinart, our leaders already know better:

Kerry was a flawed candidate, but he was not the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem was the party’s liberal base, which would have refused to nominate anyone who proposed redefining the Democratic Party in the way the ADA did in 1947. The challenge for Democrats today is not to find a different kind of presidential candidate. It is to transform the party at its grassroots so that a different kind of presidential candidate can emerge. That means abandoning the unity-at-all-costs ethos that governed American liberalism in 2004. And it requires a sustained battle to wrest the Democratic Party from the heirs of Henry Wallace. In the party today, two such heirs loom largest: Michael Moore and MoveOn.

What better symbol in America today than flabby, overweight, rude, frequently disheveled, and just downright unsexy Michael Moore to stand as strawman for the unwashed, indecent masses of “Softs” who must be reformed or purged from the Democratic Party?

Oh, yes, make no mistake about it, Beinart, not content with an anti-populist nostalgia for a Democratic Party that could be turned about on a dime by a privileged intellectual elite meeting privately in a posh Washington hotel, also revives the classic, anxious homophobic “Girlie Man” rhetoric of the period. Then, as now, erectile dysfunction seems the Democratic Party’s root political vulnerability, with only the far-sighted ADA and their modern disciples demonstrating the liberal “hard on” for killing Communists or Jihadists — what difference does it make? — needed to prod the party into getting it up again in the polls. Beinart quotes approvingly and adopts for the course of his entire argument this order of boys locker-room language from a rabidly anti-communist 1940’s journal with, to today’s ears, the fascist-sounding title of The New Leader. That it was, in later decades, widely reputed to be directly or indirectly CIA funded, seems almost anticlimactic:

In 1950, the journal The New Leader divided American liberals into “hards” and “softs.” The hards, epitomized by the ADA, believed anti-communism was the fundamental litmus test for a decent left. Non-communism was not enough; opposition to the totalitarian threat was the prerequisite for membership in American liberalism because communism was the defining moral challenge of the age.
The softs, by contrast, were not necessarily communists themselves. But they refused to make anti-communism their guiding principle.

His prescription for this party of confused, wimpy masses: an urgent infusion of hard-headed, balls-to-the-wall elitism. Today, the “hard” elites of the Democratic Party must once again conspire to save the party from its “soft” self.

[T]he Democratic Party boasts a fairly hawkish foreign policy establishment and a cadre of politicians and strategists eager to look tough. But, below this small elite sits a Wallacite grassroots that views America’s new struggle as a distraction, if not a mirage. Two elections, and two defeats, into the September 11 era, American liberalism still has not had its meeting at the Willard Hotel. And the hour is getting late.

Beinart’s militarist “hard on” for war, death, and destruction, his “muscular liberalism,” as this rhetorical strain was called during the recent presidential campaign, his all or nothing, black and white, we lead and you follow view of political necessity, hardly differs from the Big Brother Republicanism of flight-jacket-donning, macho-posturing President George Bush: “You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror.” The only discernable difference on this score is that Bush manages to proclaim all the same airy nothings about the ever-onward march of Truth, Justice and the American Way, without at the same time broadcasting a contempt for the average Americans he’s in the process of bamboozling. Which goes a long way toward explaining why he and Cheney and company are in the White House, and not Kerry and the rest of the Democratic party’s “fairly hawkish foreign policy establishment.”

Like Bush, Beinart’s noble cause, the “Faith” for which the “Fighting” is suposedly justified, remains as lofty as it is nebulous and thoughtlessly vague. Like Bush, he intones high sounding phrases and dark prophecies, such as, “totalitarian Islam” would, if it could, “reign terror upon … anyone in the Muslim world with a thirst for modernity or freedom,” in such ambiguous and self-legitimating phrases that one’s left wondering what’s threatened here: the right to vote or the right to choose between a can of Coke and a can Pepsi.

The problem, of course, is that the world is never so simple, never so black and white. If people throughout the Muslim world do indeed thirst both for the vote and the right to choose, as Americans do with fierce, patriotic determination, between a bewildering array of products and services designed to satisfy every variety of artificial need advertising and marketing can conjure up, they first “thirst,” as any American would, for running water, a functioning sewage system, electricity, basic food and shelter, and to be protected from the kind of “spreading freedom in the Muslim world” that the US military recently visited upon Fallujah — a classic case of not merely a village but an entire city that had to be destroyed to be saved.

Beinart concludes his manifesto on behalf of A Fighting Faith transforming it into a sort of thinly veiled sermon. How fortunate for this “new generation of liberals” that “yearn” for “moral purpose” is this new, he all but says, holy war against “totalitarian Islam.” War, once again, beckons as the true “calling” of the party’s faithful:

Of all the things contemporary liberals can learn from their forbearers half a century ago, perhaps the most important is that national security can be a calling. If the struggles for gay marriage and universal health care lay rightful claim to liberal idealism, so does the struggle to protect the United States by spreading freedom in the Muslim world. It, too, can provide the moral purpose for which a new generation of liberals yearn. As it did for the men and women who convened at the Willard Hotel.

But if ever there were a universal candidate for indisputable, ecumenical blasphamy it would have to be this rhetorical placement of gay marriage, universal health care, and global warfare simultaneously upon the same pedestal of the Ideal. Regardless what different peoples of different and even no faith might feel about each of these three, who in the world is going to believe that all three together don’t constitute some kind of indisputably sick, perverted sacrilege? How can a supposedly sane, educated, intellectual human being be led to utter such absurdities, and such dangerous absurdities at that?

To anyone actually familiar with the cast of characters that gathered at the Willard Hotel in January 1947 to save liberalism from itself, however, these dangerous absurdities and, indeed, their inverterate “liberal” elitism, will come as no surprise. Throughout his piece, Beinart repeatedly cites Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and it is from a passage of Schlesinger’s that he derives his title A Fighting Faith. But even in the phrasing of this title, Schlesinger is a mere stalking horse for the intellectual master of this brand of “muscular liberalism,” the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, whose Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) remains a “must read” for anyone wishing to understand the history of twentieth-century American politics and, beyond the pretense of democratic politics, America’s institutional, establishment apparatus of policy-making.

Perhaps it is unfortunate that Reinhold Niebuhr’s highly influential masterwork is best known today for supplying the main title for Noam Chomsky’s “Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies.” But one needn’t agree with Chomsky to read Moral Man and Immoral Society and realize that here is a dangerously self-satisfied intellectual, convinced of his own benevolent moral bearings, in the act of providing tortured justification for the use of violence, coercion, and mass deception to accomplish “moral good” otherwise impossible due, as he puts it directly, to “the stupidity of the average man.” Bush White House General Counsel Alberto Gonzalez, soon to head our Justice Department, would feel right at home in Niebuhr’s world of elite-defined moral immorality, coordinating the administration’s post-911 effort to redefine the meaning of “torture.” The New Leader, quoted so unqualifiedly by Beinart, which sounds so manifestly fascist today, in fact, resonates with Niebuhr’s thought from the 1930’s, not Hitler’s nor Mussolini’s. But it’s a challenge to read Niebuhr’s 1932 work today without thinking of both, each and every page along the way.

And these are “the forbearers half a century ago” from which Beinart would have contemporary liberal intellectuals and party movers and shakers take inspiration.

But actually the true forbearers of this supposedly new, hard, muscular, elite, war-fighting liberalism are even older than that. This is not the first time the The New Republic has trumpeted the “liberal” intellectual cause, the high moral virtue, of a “war against terrorism” as a means to spread freedom and democracy throughout the world.

In February 1917, The New Republic began its turn toward war, proclaiming that the Kaiser’s “Germany cannot be permitted to terrorize international territory and rather than permit a reign of terror, the United States, which is born of maritime freedom and order, has every justification for fighting. … The cause of the Allies is now unmistakably the cause of liberalism and the hope of enduring peace,” following up in April 1917 with words of congratulation to the elite intellectual class it saw itself as addressing and representing:

The American nation is entering this war under the influence of a moral verdict reached after the utmost deliberation of the more thoughtful members of the community…. The United States might have blundered into the war at any time during the past two years, but to have entered, as it is doing now, at the right time and in the clear interest of a purely international program required the exercise of an intellectualized and imaginative leadership.

The extent to which the American public had no taste for “entanglement” in a war of European empires and had to be moved, persuaded, propagandized for years before Wilson dared ask Congress for a declaration of war is a matter of historical record. How this record is seen, as a triumph or catastrophe, remains a matter of disagreement.

But in thinking about and “placing” the latest liberal “calling” to join Bush and company in “Making the World Safe For Democracy,” we all would do well to consider the disturbing resonance of an account of this current warlike New Republic liberal’s warlike New Republic forbearers offered by one who in 1917 saw only massive betrayal of all that had been human, decent, moral and progressive in liberal thought.

In June 1917, Randolphe Bourne published “War and the Intellectuals” in Seven Arts, writing of his one-time New Republic colleagues:

The intellectual state that could produce such things is one where reversion has taken place to produce more primitive ways of thinking. Simple syllogisms are substituted for analysis, things are known by their labels, our heart’s desire dictates what we shall see. The American intellectual class, having failed to make the higher synthesis, regresses to ideas that can issue in quick simplified action. Thought becomes an easy rationalization of what is actually going on or what is to happen inevitably tomorrow. …
War in the interests of democracy! this was almost the sum of their philosophy. The primitive idea to which they regressed became almost insensibly translated into a craving for action. War was seen as the crowning relief of their indecision. At last action, irresponsibility, the end of anxious and torturing attempts to reconcile peace-ideals with the drag of the world towards Hell. An end to the pain of trying to adjust facts to what they ought to be! Let us consecrate the facts as ideal! Let us join the greased slide toward war! the momentum increased. Hesitations, ironies, consciences, considerations — all were drowned in the elemental blare of doing something aggressive, colossal. The new found Sabbath “peacefulness of being at war”! The thankfulness with which so many intellectuals lay down and floated with the current betrays the hesitation and suspense through which they had been.

In September, Bourne followed up with “War Diary,” again Seven Arts:

The “liberals” who claim a realistic and pragmatic attitude in politics have disappointed us in setting up and then clinging wistfully to the belief that our war could get itself justified for an idealistic flavor, or at least a world-renovating social purpose; that they had more or less denied to the other belligerents. If these realists had had time in the hurry and scuttle of events to turn their philosophy on themselves, they might have seen how thinly disguised a rationalization this was of their emotional undertow. They wanted a League of Nations. They had an unanalyzable feeling that this was a war in which we had to be, and be in it we would. What more natural than to join the two ideas and conceive our war as the decisive factor in the attainment of the desired end! This gave them a good conscience for willing American participation, although as good men they must have loathed war and everything concerned with it. …
Thus the “liberals” who have made our war their own preserved their pragmatism. But events have shown how fearfully they imperiled their intuition and how untamable an inexorable really is. For those of us who knew a real inexorable when we saw one, and had learned from watching war what follows the loosing of the war-technique, foresaw how quickly arms and purposes would be forgotten, and how flimsy would be any liberal control of events. It is only we now who can appreciate The New Republic–the organ of applied pragmatic realism–when it complains that the League of Peace (which we entered the war to guarantee) is more remote than it was eight months ago; or that our State Department has no diplomatic policy (though it was to realize the high aims of the President’s speeches that the intellectuals willed American participation); or that we are subordinating the political management of the war to real or supposed military advantages (though militarism in the liberal mind had no justification except as a tool for advancing social ends). If, after all the idealism and creative intelligence that were shed upon America’s taking up of arms, our State Department has no policy, we are like the brave passengers who have set out for the Isles of the Blest only to find that the first mate has gone insane and jumped overboard, the rudder has come loose and dropped to the bottom of the sea, and the captain and pilot are lying dead drunk under the wheel. The stokers and engineers, however, are sill merrily forcing the speed up to twenty knots an hour and the passengers are presumably getting the pleasure of the ride.

In October 1917, Seven Arts ceased publication, its patron’s funding withdrawn over the journal’s opposition to America’s entry into the Great War. Randolphe Bourne died the following year during the influenza epidemic.

December 8, 2004

Gone

She is gone, the one you wanted, that effervescent blythe spirit. I buried her, walled her off, it is the same. I built the wall myself, mixed the mortar, carefully laid the brick. Silence. I cursed you both as the mortar dried. The housewife remains.
November 29, 2004

Culture Wars: The Soundtrack

The Andy Griffith Show

I don’t watch prime-time American network television any more, nor the HBO and other comparable cable fare that increasingly dominates evening viewing and day-after conversation in its stead. To the amazement and despair of friends, family, and other die-hard friends of “Friends”, I have thus far refused to watch even a single episode of “The Sopranos”, as I steadfastly refused “Sex and the City” before it. Mine is an almost un-American inactivity in relation to TV.

Nevertheless, the stuff does manage, thanks to my wife, to snake its way into my house. The result is that, for the past decade or so, I’ve had what might best be described as a distant, occasional listening relationship to that vast swath of America’s collective imaginative life. Poor anti-social me, I no longer know all the latest “funny” or “cool” commercials. Television is something that literally goes on in the other room of my life. And most of the time, I just blot its ambient noise out of consciousness.

A couple weeks ago, however, I suddenly found myself listening attentively from the kitchen to what was happening in the living room. I don’t know which show was on, but I was awestruck at what I heard and, more specifically, what I didn’t hear and, as I then realized, hadn’t heard in decades.

It’s worth noting that this occurred right in the midst of the post-election spin-fest that saw pundits of every political stripe grappling not retrospectively, with the reality of the campaign season through which we had just passed, but, without the least acknowledgement, prospectively, with Karl Rove’s opening salvo of the 2006 mid-term elections: that “Values Voters” had tipped the scales for Bush. How much more reasonable to conclude that the Swift-Boat Veterans smear campaign had. But of course that dirty-trick operation and its once-upon-a-time real impact had gone right down Orwell’s memory hole; little doubt, with the help of Rove’s well-timed orchestration of “Values Voters. Did they or didn’t they?” Always claim victory in a way that distracts from the way it’s actually achieved. These were the issues uppermost in my mind when I suddenly found myself listening attentively to the television.

What I heard and heard as missing from any recent experience of mine of the pervasive background sound of American television was the chorus of southern and regional American dialects that filled my childhood and early adolescence in the 1960s, when “The Andy Griffith Show” and its spawn rode the charts, and into the 1970s when Burt Reynolds was considered a sex-symbol heartthrob. In their once familiar places, I suddenly heard nothing but an offensive cacophony of greedy, empty, consuming, status-jockeying, utterly self-absorbed and selfish New York and LA voices, and straining to be something they weren’t quite yet, a sub-whirl of would-be New York and LA voices — years and years of them — as if, now, even actors and actresses from elsewhere had grown up picking out and hearing only the Long Island and Valley sounds they aspired to become.

Now, I must quickly point out that these missing southern, regional American voices were neither those of my own family nor of our typical television viewing during the 1960s and early 1970s. My sisters and I grew up hearing two languages beyond English spoken daily in our home and in our extended family’s homes during holidays: Spanish and Chinese. My middle sister and I, in kindergarten and first grade, were isolated once a day to “Speech Therapy” along with other potential “retards,” when we first moved to California. So thick did our Philadelphia accent sound to unaccustomed ears that our very capacity to learn was in doubt or at least thought imperiled. It’s thus from a rather different vantage than personal or cultural nostalgia that I hear the relative absence of southern, regional voices in American television.

And it’s not that they are completely missing. I don’t need anyone writing with a list of shows with southern actors and actresses. I won’t watch. And I will try my damnedest not to listen. I’m simply noting that once upon a time southern, regional voices were as unavoidable as commercials no matter how often or when one flipped the channels. It’s hard to believe now, even for those of us who can remember it, that once that range of American voices was almost co-extensive with television itself. It’s hard to remember that once upon a time people also regularly remarked, in protest, the disappearance of this dimension of American television. But that, too, was a long, long, long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.

No wonder so many people, today, living in “The Red States” feel assaulted by “The Media” as something distant and culturally alien forced upon them.

No wonder so many can be led to believe that “liberal elites” elsewhere are to blame for the divorce, abortion, and teen pregnancy rates that soar higher than any Massachusetts record in their own communities, broken and re-broken economically and socially by the continued drain of their “best and brightest” youth to Blue State education and career opportunities.

It’s critical to grasp the truth of what they see and hear. They have been assaulted. They have been culturally beaten. And what comes over the air waves, through the cables, and to the movies houses is for all intents and purposes an oppressively narrow cultural monocrop targeting the densest, most affluent demographics Hollywood and Madison Avenue (and their now more distributed ilk) can hunt down, pick up, net, corral, or cultivate.

Black Friday in Kansas

But no amount of prayer in school, no rededication to family values, no ban of abortion, no re-closeting of gays and lesbians, no euphemistic return of white pride, no number of guns on the rack or by the bedside, no amount of patriotic flag waving or jingoist America-First chest-beating over the dead bodies of foreigners around the globe, and not even the return of regional programming to American television will restore these communities.

Because the enemy is not elsewhere. It’s your own hand, reaching into that same Black Friday Devil’s Cornucopia Sale Bin for that same intoxicating, media-fashion, must-have crap that’s poisoning us all…no matter what we sound like.